For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.

How THORChain halts affect Rujira

THORChain halt controls (Mimirs) can pause specific chains, contracts, or actions. The table below shows what would remain available, be partially affected, or become unavailable on Rujira when each control is active. Read each row independently and check the numbered notes for scope and exceptions.

For current network status and active halts, visit the Rujira status page.

Mimir

Status

Secured Asset: Deposit

Secured Asset: Withdraw

Secured Asset: Send

Base Layer Swap

Market & limit

Oracle

Virtualization Strategy

Borrow / increase

Add collateral

Repay & manage

Liquidations

Lending

Staking

Indices

HaltTrading

1

OK

OK

OK

Halted

OK

OK

Halted

Halted⁴

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

Halt{chain}Trading

1

OK

OK

OK

Halted¹

OK

OK

Halted¹

Halted⁴

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

HaltSecuredGlobal

1

Halted

Halted

OK

Halted²

OK

OK

Halted

Halted⁴

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

HaltSecuredDeposit-{chain}

1

Halted¹

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

HaltSecuredWithdraw-{chain}

1

OK

Halted¹

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

Halted⁴

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

HaltWasmGlobal

1

OK

OK

OK

OK

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

OK

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

HaltWasmCs-{checksum}

1

OK

OK

OK

OK

Halted³

Halted³

Halted³

Halted³

OK

Halted³

Halted³

Halted³

Halted³

Halted³

HaltWasmContract-{suffix}

1

OK

OK

OK

OK

Halted³

Halted³

Halted³

Halted³

OK

Halted³

Halted³

Halted³

Halted³

Halted³

HaltChainGlobal

1

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halt{chain}Chain

1

Halted¹

Halted¹

OK

Halted¹

OK

OK

Halted¹

Halted⁴

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

HaltTHORChain

1

OK⁵

Halted

Halted

Halted⁵

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

SolvencyHalt{chain}Chain

1

Halted¹

Halted¹

OK

Halted¹

OK

OK

Halted¹

Halted⁴

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

NodePauseChainGlobal

<pause-until block height>

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

Halted

HaltSigning{chain}

1

OK

Halted¹

OK

Halted⁶

OK

OK

OK

Halted⁴

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

HALTSIGNING

1

OK

Halted

OK

Halted⁶

OK

OK

OK

Halted⁴

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

HaltOracle

1

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

Halted⁷

OK

Halted

OK

Halted

Halted

OK

OK

OK⁸

Notes: Scope and exceptions

  1. Matching external chain only. Other chains remain available. Existing secured balances can still be sent within Rujira. The THOR-specific case is shown separately.

  2. Secured-asset swap routes only. HaltSecuredGlobal blocks THORChain swaps into or out of secured assets. Unrelated L1-to-L1 routes remain available.

  3. Matching execution dependency only. Actions that execute the halted contract, or a required contract whose execution is halted, are unavailable. A checksum halt affects every contract using that checksum. Unrelated products remain available.

  4. Composite actions inherit their halted steps. For example, borrowing followed by an affected swap or L1 withdrawal is unavailable. Borrowing entirely within the App Layer remains possible under trading or signing halts. Apply this rule to optional conversion steps in other products too. “Add collateral” means a direct transfer to an existing credit account, without borrowing or another contract action.

  5. HaltTHORChain blocks App Layer submissions. Secured withdrawals and swaps submitted from THORChain are halted. A standard secured deposit originating on an external chain can still work. An externally initiated L1-to-L1 swap may also work if its route does not require THOR/RUNE.

  6. Signing halts affect external outbounds. Signing halts prevent affected L1 outbounds from being signed. A withdrawal or swap request may still be accepted, but its outbound delivery can remain pending until signing resumes. Swaps settling entirely in secured assets or RUNE on THORChain do not require external signing. This also explains why VS execution remains available.

  7. Enshrined-feed orders are affected. Oracle orders using unavailable enshrined prices halt. A market configured with a pool-derived price source needs separate treatment. Ghost Credit position actions use enshrined valuations, so repayment, management, and liquidation execution are affected too.

  8. Indices depend on their implementation. The NAMI implementation uses pool-derived prices, so HaltOracle does not directly halt it. Other index contracts could still be impacted.

Other relevant Mimirs

These settings can affect deployments, transaction costs, asset funding, or specific swap routes without halting the entire App Layer.

  • HaltWasmDeployer-{address}: Restricts code uploads and deployment permissions for an address. New deployments and some upgrades may be blocked; existing deployed contracts are not automatically halted.

  • BankSendEnabled: Disabling this blocks standard user transfers of RUNE and secured assets, including direct collateral top-ups. Contract-initiated transfers are exempt.

  • WasmMinGasPrice: Sets the minimum gas price for smart-contract transactions. Increases raise RUNE fee requirements and can cause transactions with insufficient fees to be rejected.

  • TVLCapBasisPoints: Controls the network’s asset-deposit cap relative to bonded RUNE. When the cap is enforced and reached, new secured-asset deposits can be rejected.

  • RAGNAROK-{asset}: Disables affected Base Layer pool trading and VS routes. When applied to a chain’s gas asset, it also affects tokens on that chain.

  • HaltMemoless: Pauses reference-memo registration and usage. Funding and swap routes relying on memoless transactions become unavailable; full-memo routes may remain available.

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