How THORChain halts affect Rujira
THORChain halt controls (Mimirs) can pause specific chains, contracts, or actions. The table below shows what would remain available, be partially affected, or become unavailable on Rujira when each control is active. Read each row independently and check the numbered notes for scope and exceptions.
For current network status and active halts, visit the Rujira status page.
Mimir
Status
Secured Asset: Deposit
Secured Asset: Withdraw
Secured Asset: Send
Base Layer Swap
Market & limit
Oracle
Virtualization Strategy
Borrow / increase
Add collateral
Repay & manage
Liquidations
Lending
Staking
Indices
HaltTrading
1
OK
OK
OK
Halted
OK
OK
Halted
Halted⁴
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
Halt{chain}Trading
1
OK
OK
OK
Halted¹
OK
OK
Halted¹
Halted⁴
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
HaltSecuredGlobal
1
Halted
Halted
OK
Halted²
OK
OK
Halted
Halted⁴
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
HaltSecuredDeposit-{chain}
1
Halted¹
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
HaltSecuredWithdraw-{chain}
1
OK
Halted¹
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
Halted⁴
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
HaltWasmGlobal
1
OK
OK
OK
OK
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
OK
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
HaltWasmCs-{checksum}
1
OK
OK
OK
OK
Halted³
Halted³
Halted³
Halted³
OK
Halted³
Halted³
Halted³
Halted³
Halted³
HaltWasmContract-{suffix}
1
OK
OK
OK
OK
Halted³
Halted³
Halted³
Halted³
OK
Halted³
Halted³
Halted³
Halted³
Halted³
HaltChainGlobal
1
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halt{chain}Chain
1
Halted¹
Halted¹
OK
Halted¹
OK
OK
Halted¹
Halted⁴
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
HaltTHORChain
1
OK⁵
Halted
Halted
Halted⁵
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
SolvencyHalt{chain}Chain
1
Halted¹
Halted¹
OK
Halted¹
OK
OK
Halted¹
Halted⁴
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
NodePauseChainGlobal
<pause-until block height>
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
Halted
HaltSigning{chain}
1
OK
Halted¹
OK
Halted⁶
OK
OK
OK
Halted⁴
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
HALTSIGNING
1
OK
Halted
OK
Halted⁶
OK
OK
OK
Halted⁴
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
HaltOracle
1
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
Halted⁷
OK
Halted
OK
Halted
Halted
OK
OK
OK⁸
Notes: Scope and exceptions
Matching external chain only. Other chains remain available. Existing secured balances can still be sent within Rujira. The THOR-specific case is shown separately.
Secured-asset swap routes only.
HaltSecuredGlobalblocks THORChain swaps into or out of secured assets. Unrelated L1-to-L1 routes remain available.Matching execution dependency only. Actions that execute the halted contract, or a required contract whose execution is halted, are unavailable. A checksum halt affects every contract using that checksum. Unrelated products remain available.
Composite actions inherit their halted steps. For example, borrowing followed by an affected swap or L1 withdrawal is unavailable. Borrowing entirely within the App Layer remains possible under trading or signing halts. Apply this rule to optional conversion steps in other products too. “Add collateral” means a direct transfer to an existing credit account, without borrowing or another contract action.
HaltTHORChainblocks App Layer submissions. Secured withdrawals and swaps submitted from THORChain are halted. A standard secured deposit originating on an external chain can still work. An externally initiated L1-to-L1 swap may also work if its route does not require THOR/RUNE.Signing halts affect external outbounds. Signing halts prevent affected L1 outbounds from being signed. A withdrawal or swap request may still be accepted, but its outbound delivery can remain pending until signing resumes. Swaps settling entirely in secured assets or RUNE on THORChain do not require external signing. This also explains why VS execution remains available.
Enshrined-feed orders are affected. Oracle orders using unavailable enshrined prices halt. A market configured with a pool-derived price source needs separate treatment. Ghost Credit position actions use enshrined valuations, so repayment, management, and liquidation execution are affected too.
Indices depend on their implementation. The NAMI implementation uses pool-derived prices, so
HaltOracledoes not directly halt it. Other index contracts could still be impacted.
Other relevant Mimirs
These settings can affect deployments, transaction costs, asset funding, or specific swap routes without halting the entire App Layer.
HaltWasmDeployer-{address}: Restricts code uploads and deployment permissions for an address. New deployments and some upgrades may be blocked; existing deployed contracts are not automatically halted.BankSendEnabled: Disabling this blocks standard user transfers of RUNE and secured assets, including direct collateral top-ups. Contract-initiated transfers are exempt.WasmMinGasPrice: Sets the minimum gas price for smart-contract transactions. Increases raise RUNE fee requirements and can cause transactions with insufficient fees to be rejected.TVLCapBasisPoints: Controls the network’s asset-deposit cap relative to bonded RUNE. When the cap is enforced and reached, new secured-asset deposits can be rejected.RAGNAROK-{asset}: Disables affected Base Layer pool trading and VS routes. When applied to a chain’s gas asset, it also affects tokens on that chain.HaltMemoless: Pauses reference-memo registration and usage. Funding and swap routes relying on memoless transactions become unavailable; full-memo routes may remain available.
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